There is a colloquial Chinese proverb that goes something like this: “It takes the same amount of time to boil one egg as it does to boil 10 eggs.” But this wisdom is questionable, given that the process of peeling 10 eggs takes on a completely different dynamic.
At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Summit in September 2024, the Chinese government hosted 51 African countries. Although this event was presented as a success story in relations between China and the entire continent, this idea of homogeneity has been unraveled individually over time, with bilateral relations at different levels and using different means. ignoring the concept. Viewing China’s relations with African states as a unified policy direction is misleading both for China and for those watching from afar.
BRICS was unable to issue a joint statement in support of reform of the UN Security Council because two new members, Egypt and Ethiopia, were unable to reach an agreement, and this impasse meant that BRICS was unable to issue a joint statement supporting reform of the UN Security Council. I lost my sexuality even more. China’s position as Africa’s biggest partner is being tested as two major African countries with regional power ambitions fail to see eye to eye. As tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt continue to rise, China needs to keep a close watch.
Ethiopia intends to recognize Somaliland’s statehood in exchange for maritime access, while Egypt has provided military aid to Somalia, which claims sovereignty over Somaliland. This development comes after a long-simmering conflict between the two North African countries. Tensions have arisen from the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile, increasing Egypt’s concerns about vital water supplies.
Given that China partially financed and supported the construction of the dam, Beijing’s rhetoric of win-win and harmonious engagement in Africa is called into question. Still, China has successfully cooperated with both Ethiopia and its traditional enemy Eritrea for decades. While the benefits of doing business with China clearly outweigh the political costs of doing business with a rival’s friend, the utility of unfettered friendships with great powers is less certain.
When the People’s Republic of China was first recognized by the United Nations in 1971, 26 African countries expressed support for the communist state, just over half of the approximately 40 independent African states in existence at the time. . Fast forward to 2024, and China maintains strong diplomatic relations with 53 out of 54 African countries. The respective relationships are characterized by trade ties, investments, concessional financing, security cooperation, and “soft power” that includes numerous cultural, educational, and technical cooperation initiatives, and more recently, an increasing presence of Chinese media on the continent. It has been built up through various means, including increasing .
Although the idea that China has strong ties to African countries due to the postcolonial mentality shared by the Global South is not inaccurate, history only partially explains China’s interests and position on the continent. Not yet. China’s long-term orientation in Africa includes both access to natural resources and continued diplomatic support. During the Cold War, after the Sino-Soviet split, China often opposed Soviet influence and sometimes sided with the United States. As Sino-Russian relations are currently on the rise, China is acting cautiously so as not to undermine Russia’s involvement in Africa. China’s role as Africa’s largest military supplier is unlikely to have a significant impact on Russian adventurism on the continent. China continues to import oil while Russian mercenaries prop up a rogue regime in the Sahel.
China’s foreign policy pragmatism also has an impact in Africa, as the Chinese government also does not directly confront Western interests in Africa. China’s diplomatic presence on the continent rivals that of the United States. The construction of China’s only military base overseas in Djibouti, which also hosts a US naval base, is often seen as a challenge to US influence in the region. However, depending on overall Sino-American relations, China’s presence could be justified as a means of cooperation rather than confrontation to maintain security around the Horn of Africa, particularly in counter-piracy. Similarly, China’s consideration of building a base in Equatorial Guinea would do little to undermine the United States’ position in the Atlantic.
Meanwhile, the United States has taken a cue from China’s foreign policy strategy and leveraged China’s influence in Africa by funding infrastructure projects linking inland mining areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia with access to Africa. I took a definite step to check it out. sea. In August 2024, the first shipment of copper mined in the continental heart of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was shipped by rail to Angola’s Atlantic port of Lovita and departed for the United States. The 100-year-old railway was first renovated by China in 2014, but over the next decade it deteriorated due to poor maintenance.
The adoption of the Lobito Railway Corridor by Western companies with US support was a double snub for China. Rail access from the mineral-rich Congo River basin to the Atlantic Ocean has sidelined another of China’s flagship projects in the African hinterland. The Tanzania-Zambia Railway, built in the 1970s at great expense in then-impoverished China, allowed landlocked Zambia to export copper and other minerals via Tanzania to ports in the Indian Ocean. Reduced dependence on British colonial routes through minorities. Ruled Rhodesia and South Africa. By 2015, the railway was crippled by poor maintenance.
As China spreads its efforts in Africa thinly, the effectiveness of competing with the United States on strategic rail corridors appears to be diminishing.
Still, China far outweighs the United States as a trading partner with the entire continent. Despite disruptions caused by the coronavirus pandemic, total trade between Africa and China will reach $262 billion by 2023, five times the continent’s trade with the United States. However, for individual African countries, these numbers do not necessarily translate into success, with China’s trade surplus reaching $64 billion. In terms of value, Africa’s exports to China account for only 60% of China’s exports to the mainland.
Africa’s largest importers of Chinese goods are South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt, all of which are among the continent’s top economies and have regional power ambitions in their respective geographical neighbourhoods. The continent’s largest exporters to China were Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa and Congo, accounting for nearly 70% of total African exports to China (mostly natural resources). The remaining approximately 50 African countries receive a much smaller share of the pie and benefit to varying degrees.
The outcomes of trade between Africa and China are mixed. While crude oil exports to China from most African oil-producing countries have fallen sharply, mineral exports have more than tripled over the past decade. New industries in semi-processed natural resources and agricultural products are emerging as new sources of export for the region. Despite the continent’s total trade deficit with China decreasing, trade asymmetries remain significant in several countries. However, the trade imbalance with China is not limited to Africa, but is comparable to many countries and regions around the world, to varying degrees.
Western criticism of China’s involvement in Africa is usually one-sided, and negative perceptions of China’s intentions often stem from a lack of transparency rather than facts. China’s dealings with African countries may be opaque, but like most transactions between states in the international system, they are pragmatic and profit-oriented rather than predatory. However, because of this profit-seeking nature, China’s track record is not always perfect and often reflects the common English idiom that you can’t make an omelet without breaking eggs.
China’s diplomacy and soft power have not always focused on the same African countries where Chinese companies are deeply involved in natural resource extraction. Moreover, while China’s long-term orientation and elitist approach to relations sit well with African leaders, it does not necessarily mean that it will lead to global and, more importantly, regional It is not reflected in recognition.
For example, Chinese energy companies are complicating regional power relations and endangering the security of communities in oil-producing regions of South Sudan, Uganda, and Nigeria. The Chinese-funded East African crude oil pipeline has particularly negative environmental and economic impacts on Uganda. In the past, vocal concerns about the environmental impact of Chinese mining in Ghana have been suppressed through political means, journalists in South Africa have faced censorship for exposing China’s repression of the Xinjiang Uyghur people, and democracies in both countries have been suppressed. It damaged the practice.
In Nigeria, both trade imbalances and debt hurt public opinion toward China. Relations between China and Angola have become somewhat strained as the profitability of Chinese projects has declined and China’s involvement in infrastructure has become inconsistent.
At the same time, the nature of China’s involvement in Africa is becoming more decentralized as it grapples with economic challenges at home. Considering this, China cannot succeed in Africa without maintaining a delicate balance between its own interests and the needs of African countries and communities. In that context, both Chinese actors and other actors on the continent would do well to adhere to the African proverb: “He who sells eggs does not start a fight in the market.”
