The Horn of Africa region faces a variety of crises, including internal armed conflict, terrorism, drought, and famine. There are inter-state tensions in the region, such as the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, due to prevailing conflicts and security situations in each state. Moreover, the strategic importance of the region has led various extra-regional powers, such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, China, and Russia, to increase their involvement in the Horn of Africa.
At the same time, the efforts of existing multilateral and regional institutions, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), to manage these complex issues are often in vain. Against this background, countries in the region are increasingly relying on minilateralism. This trend, in turn, has significant implications for the functioning of regional mechanisms and regional security. Below is a discussion of contemporary minilateral practices in the Horn of Africa and their impact on regional peace and security.
The rise of mini-lateralism Minilateralism has become a common method of international relations between states in the 21st century. As a concept, minilateralism is very fluid. This refers to a small group of like-minded nations pursuing mutual goals. This is considered to be a more agile and targeted approach than multilateralism, which “requires as few countries as possible to have the greatest possible impact on solving a particular problem”. Masu. In contrast to traditional multilateral systems, minilateralism brings speed, ad hoc flexibility, levels of informality, and innovative experimentalism to diplomatic initiatives.
There have been countless mini-nation agreements around the world, including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the United States, Japan, India, and Australia. Trilateral framework between UAE, India and France. The I2U2 group consists of India, Israel, the United States, and the UAE. The BRICS bloc primarily consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. MIKTA Group consists of Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Türkiye, and Australia.
The recent prevalence of minilateralism can be attributed to several factors. One reason for this is the inability of prevailing multilateral and regional institutions to address complex issues. For example, the rise of minilateral efforts in the Indo-Pacific region is one of the byproducts of increasing fragmentation and the inability of the region’s main governing body, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to adequately coordinate efforts among member states. Department.
In addition to these institutional factors, the concentration of interests and threat perceptions among states facilitates the practice of minilateralism. In other words, when countries’ strategic priorities are closely aligned, they pave the way for minilateral arrangements between countries.
Minilateralism in the Horn of Africa In recent years, the Horn of Africa has shown a trend towards mini-lateralism. Domestic political changes are important drivers of this trend, along with strategic developments, common interests between nations, and extra-regional engagement.
These mini-lateral arrangements involve a variety of actors within and outside the Horn region. They are mainly reflected through changing alliances between states and ad hoc reconfigurations in volatile regions. This was partly due to a lack of transparency in diplomatic discussions and agreements, which were particularly informal.
In many cases, mini-lateral arrangements in the Horn take place amidst domestic political changes. These transitions occurred in Ethiopia in 2018, Sudan in 2019, and Somalia in 2022, resulting in new dynamics in interstate relations and minilateral practices in the region.
For example, one of the recent mini-nation experiences in the Horn of Africa is the trilateral cooperation between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia, called the “Horn of Africa Cooperation”. The three countries signed the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation in September 2018 and also signed the Joint Plan of Action in January 2020. However, Somalia’s new leadership after elections in May 2022 and the Pretoria Agreement that ended the two-year Somali war in northern Ethiopia rapidly changed the Addis Ababa-Asmara-Mogadishu alliance.
Minilateralism in the Horn of Africa is in part an extension of existing bilateral relations. Just as the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2018 provided the basis for the Horn of Africa cooperation framework, rising tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia are presenting similar opportunities for new minilateral practices. . This tension has come to the fore following the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland on January 1, 2024. The memorandum provides for Ethiopia to lease 20 kilometers of Somaliland’s coastline for 50 years, granting it maritime access and the construction of military bases in exchange for the self-proclaimed independent state of Somaliland.
The Ethiopia-Somaliland port agreement rapidly changed the geopolitical landscape of the Horn region with the rise of mini-state cooperation between Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt. The three countries in conflict with Ethiopia held a trilateral meeting on October 10, 2024, following frequent high-level state visits and mutual bilateral engagement.
Recent practices of minilateralism in the Horn of Africa also demonstrate functional problem-based coordination between states. A notable example in this regard is the Somali Frontier States Summit held on February 1, 2023. The dialogue was attended by leaders of Somalia and its neighboring countries, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. Leaders of the frontline states agreed to carry out joint operations in areas under the control of the terrorist organization al-Shabaab. They also supported Somalia’s efforts to fully lift the arms embargo imposed on the country since the early 1990s, which was later lifted under UN Security Council Resolution 2714/2023. Ta.
Finally, mini-lateralism in the Horn of Africa is taking place against the backdrop of recent foreign power involvement in the region. In this regard, one example is the cooperation between the UAE, Somaliland and Ethiopia. In 2017, the two countries signed a concession agreement regarding Berbera Port, giving 30% of the port’s share to the Somaliland government, 19% to Ethiopia, and 51% to the UAE. Additionally, the Quint Group, which includes Qatar, Turkey, the UAE, the UK and the US, on Somalia and the Troika Group of Norway, the UK and the US on South Sudan represent other small-scale commitments to the Horn. of Africa.
Implications of mini-lateralism
Diverse minilateral practices in the Horn of Africa have had mixed outcomes for states and the wider region. On the other hand, some minilateral groups contribute to the influx of humanitarian aid, development aid, and infrastructure development, and serve as forums for dialogue.
Nevertheless, mini-state agreements have had a destabilizing effect on regional security in a variety of ways. By its very nature, minilateralism is not comprehensive. Its practice in the Horn of Africa therefore hinders the development of a comprehensive approach to addressing the region’s common security challenges. This will further weaken powerful multilateral and regional institutions, such as IGAD, that seek to maintain peace and stability in the Horn of Africa.
Tensions between nations and various crises in the region, such as the ongoing armed conflicts in Sudan and Ethiopia, the al-Shabaab threat, and most recently the resurgence of the Islamic State (IS) in Somalia, all have multilateral and regional implications. We need your cooperation. approach rather than an ad hoc confederation of selected states. Given the level of conflict between states in the region, a trend toward minilateralism will further exacerbate tensions between states and increase the risk of direct and proxy conflicts in the region.
Additionally, while the Somali Frontier States Summit contributed to the fight against al-Shabaab, continuing tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia could jeopardize the fight against terrorism in the region. This situation is further complicated by the withdrawal of the current African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and the transition to a new AU-led mission in Somalia from January 2025.
Moreover, minilateral practices will lead to increased competition between extra-regional actors such as the UAE and Turkey for influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region.
In general, the Horn of Africa region has recently experienced various forms of mini-lateralism that affect peace and security in the region. Addressing the negative effects of mini-state practices will require increased engagement with multilateral and regional institutions such as IGAD and the most pressing security concerns in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, it is important to develop comprehensive cooperation initiatives and confidence-building measures among countries in the region.
