The annual festival of diplomats, also known as the United Nations General Assembly, has begun. On the heels of intense negotiations over the UN Future Summit, a key issue for world leaders will be the agreed text for reforming the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), perhaps the UN’s most powerful forum. For African countries, recent developments represent a crossroads situation. Should we continue to pursue gradual reform of the Security Council, or should we challenge its entire premise?
The need for Security Council reform
The United Nations Security Council was established by major powers in 1945 after World War II, but at that time most African countries were still under colonial rule and had no representation in international affairs. I didn’t. Today, Africa is highly represented in the issues that the Security Council addresses; in 2018, more than 50 percent of Council meetings and 70 percent of its resolutions concerned peace and security in Africa; remains as it was in 1945. The UNSC maintains a structure of five “permanent” members, each with veto power, plus 10 rotating members elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms and without veto power. Out of a total of 15 seats, there are always three African seats. However, they are always in a “rotating” group and have no veto power.
Unsurprisingly, given the changes in the independence of African states since 1945 and the substantive focus of the UN Security Council, calls for stronger African representation will only grow stronger over time.
Africa’s position on Security Council reform over the past 20 years
Originally, 20 years ago in 2005, a group of African leaders called the African Union Committee of Ten (C-10) was established with the mandate to promote a common African position in accordance with Security Council reform . In the same year, the African Union (AU) adopted two documents that provided a framework for a common position on UN reform. The first was the Ezulwini Agreement adopted at the AU’s 22nd Extraordinary Executive Committee meeting in March, and the second was the Sirte Declaration adopted in June. The agreement includes increased capacity to address development challenges and governance, increased African participation by expanding the UN Secretariat, and, most importantly, ensuring that Africa is “fully represented in all decision-making.” It included points for reform of the United Nations, such as: In “the organs of the United Nations, especially the Security Council,” the continent should have at least two permanent members “with all the privileges and prerogatives of a permanent member, including the right of veto.”
More recently, during the 2023 UN General Assembly Annual Debate, then-UN General Assembly President Dennis Francis acknowledged that without structural reforms, the Security Council’s effectiveness and legitimacy would only be further undermined. In the same year, at the C-10 summit, Equatorial Guinea’s President Obiang Nguema Mbasogo pointed out the need for renewed efforts to confront the historical injustice and marginalization that African countries had faced for decades. .
In August 2024, at a United Nations debate on Africa’s participation in the Security Council, Sierra Leone President Julius Maada Bio called for Africa to have two permanent and two non-permanent seats on the Security Council. He added that the veto should be abolished and that if UN member states wish to retain the veto, it must be extended to all new permanent members of the Security Council “as a matter of justice.” He said it must be done. Back in August, Namibia’s foreign policy chief Peya Mshelenga emphasized Namibia’s alignment with the Ezulwini Accord and the 2005 Sirte Declaration, referring to the Security Council’s high-level discussions on maintaining international peace and security. I emphasized it again. He further added that this reform is not only in Africa’s interest, but also reflects recent geopolitical developments, with the aim of improving the UN’s ability to maintain international security while promoting development. He said it was aimed at
Calls for reform in Africa appear to have global support
Indeed, Security Council reform is an aspiration that Africa shares with countries and coalitions around the world. One such group is the G4 (consisting of Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan). The G4 also proposed reforms to expand the UN Security Council to 25 members, adding four non-permanent members and six permanent members. India introduced this reform model on behalf of the G4 during intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform in March 2024. Permanent members of the Security Council also appear to be changing their positions.
In July 2024, the UK used its rotating Presidency to call for the Council to expand its permanent membership to include Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, as well as representatives from Africa. In early September of this year, the United States declared its support for adding two African countries to the Security Council as permanent members, but it should be noted that these countries do not have a veto. The report also stated that the United States expressed support for the representation of Germany, India, Japan, and South America on the Security Council, but that Brazil did not express support. Last month, France also reaffirmed its support for Security Council reform: “France’s position is clear, long-standing and firm. Africa, which accounts for more than a quarter of the UN’s membership, is not represented in the permanent membership. of the Security Council. This must and can change now. ” However, like the United States, Paris does not support extending the veto in the Security Council.
China also says it supports the push for reforms, but warns that any new reforms must prioritize the effectiveness of decision-making while reflecting changing international geopolitical dynamics. Therefore, at the recent Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit held in Beijing, China expressed support for a permanent African representative on the Security Council, but did not clearly support the Ezulwini Accord or the 2005 Sirte Declaration. It wasn’t done. Similarly, Russia supports calls for reform, but only under special conditions, as it is also concerned about the inability of its institutions to deal with conflict resolution. Having said that, the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa endorsed the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration for the first time this year in a joint statement by the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs and International Relations. Meeting in Russia.
opposition to reform
Opposition to the reform has also been raised from several quarters.
The first is a group of 12 member states called United for Consensus (UfC), whose member states object to certain countries gaining permanent seats and use a variety of tactics to seek reform. It has obstructed the process from moving forward. The UfC is led by Italy, with Pakistan and Canada also participating.
A second reason for opposition to reform is that the new member states, for example African countries, do not actually have enough economic and political weight to become strong permanent members, and therefore, with or without veto power. They are concerned that their seats will be illegitimate. Waste of space and time. There is an argument that increasing the number of African seats is putting the cart before the horse. First, let’s get Africa back on its feet economically. Then the need for Africa’s seat will become clear. While this approach may seem very fair, especially within an ostensibly meritocratic multilateral system led by capitalism, its critics argue that it fails to account for historical injustices. They argue that they overlook the possibility that a lack of strong representation and decision-making is an important factor contributing to the problem. (endogenously) causing Africa’s lack of economic development.
The third source of opposition to reform is even more fundamental. The question is whether the Security Council should exist in its current form at all. In this view, the expansion of Africa’s “permanent” membership, especially without veto rights, could legitimize a highly dysfunctional system without bringing meaningful benefits to the continent. It would essentially support and perpetuate exclusivity of power and differential access to it. Is it really worth increasing influence within the multilateral system at the expense of other countries, based on seemingly zero-sum principles? Would it be more valuable for Africans, and the world at large, to instead focus on truly democratizing power on the world stage?
For this reason, there are calls for the complete abolition of the veto. It also includes the author’s company Development Reimagined, which said it would completely abolish permanent membership, while extending the terms of elected members and allowing all elected members to have veto power. , there was also an alternative proposal calling for a reconsideration of the Security Council.
What happens next?
These important issues will undoubtedly be at the center of discussions among diplomats and leaders during the UN Future Summit, and should drive the final negotiating text. The desire for Security Council reform among African policymakers is primarily driven by the objective of addressing the historical injustices that Africa has faced on the world stage, the urgency of restoring legitimacy to the United Nations and multilateralism, and the need to reform the Security Council. and has been guided by the needs of African countries. As global security competition among great powers intensifies, leaders need to have more say in protecting their countries’ security interests. However, large questions remain about whether a non-veto permanent membership (a compromise that most, if not all, existing permanent members would be willing to support) would achieve these three objectives. Discussion continues. Should Africa compromise, remain committed to a full deal, or rethink the Security Council? The choice is not easy.
Ovigwe Eguegu is a policy analyst at Development Reimagined, focusing on geopolitics, diplomacy, and international organizations. Hannah Ryder is a senior associate (nonresident) in the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, and CEO of Development Reimagined. Trevor Lwere is an economist at Development Reimagined.
