Late in the afternoon on October 7, an Israeli software engineer in his mid-30s found himself driving down a deserted road parallel to the border fence separating Gaza and Israel. He had been fighting for hours with an AK-47 he had taken from a dead Hamas militant. Now he and three friends were heading to the town of Ohad to search for their missing relatives.
“It wasn’t until we left south that we realized how big this was. It was like the apocalypse,” an engineer who did not wish to be named said last week. “There were hundreds of bodies of civilians in cars and on the streets, hundreds of bodies of terrorists in pickup trucks and motorcycles. There were bodies of police officers, and military vehicles were set on fire. We were alone.”
He was among dozens, perhaps hundreds, of Israelis who headed to the fighting zone around Gaza on their own on the morning of the attack launched by Hamas on October 7 last year. Although many were hailed as heroes by their compatriots, the fact that they were even needed in the first place highlights the profound failings of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which a year later still has millions of It remains part of the attack’s traumatic legacy for Israelis.
The ensuing accusations are part of a broader, bitter debate over who bears responsibility for Israel’s biggest security failure since its founding in 1948. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has avoided accepting responsibility, but several senior military and intelligence officials have acknowledged responsibility. He either resigned or admitted his mistake.
In total, about 1,200 people were killed in Hamas attacks. Most of the dead were civilians, many killed in their homes or at music festivals. Victims included children and the elderly. The United Nations investigation found reasonable grounds to believe that the assailants committed sexual violence, including rape and gang rape, at multiple locations. Hamas militants and other militant groups that followed them in Gaza also held about 250 hostages, of whom about 100 remain in the territory.
We were told that the first line of defense was Hamas. They have too much to lose by attacking. reserve combat medic
Since the attack, Israeli media has focused on what went wrong. Between growing concerns following warnings of a possible large-scale attack from Gaza into southern Israel, and a widespread belief among senior military officers and political leaders that Hamas has been deterred by repeated conflicts, The image of the supreme commander caught in the middle emerged. Many officials believe that the huge amount of direct aid sent to Gaza by Qatar and economic incentives, such as permits for Palestinian workers to work in Israel, have also contributed to Hamas, which has been in power since 2007, at least in the short term. He was convinced that he had persuaded him to refrain from violence. semester. David Balnea, head of Mossad, Israel’s main foreign intelligence agency, did not mention Hamas in a speech about potential threats to the country at a counterterrorism conference held months before the attack.
“We are complacent, lazy and suffer from a kind of groupthink, and we will pay a heavy price for that,” one military intelligence officer, an expert on Gaza, said on October 7. told the Guardian shortly after the attack.
The second major issue was confidence in the supposedly impregnable $1 billion fence built around the territory.
A reserve officer who served several tours around Gaza in the year before the attack was shocked by the new attitude of Israeli Defense Force officers.
“There were vehicles that simply didn’t run, equipment that didn’t work, and patrols that didn’t happen because there were threats. When I asked them how they were going to fight back if there was a major attack, they said, ‘That’s not going to happen. “It’s crazy,” a reserve combat medic said last month.
“We were told that the first line of defense was Hamas, because they had too much to lose in an attack and were going to detain their people themselves. And there was a fence anyway, and no one could use it. We can’t get through.”We actually discussed this with senior executives, but no resolution was reached. ”
A series of mistakes were made in the days before the attack. Concerned local military commanders ordered an assessment and reported intense training by elite Hamas fighters, but took no action. In the early hours of October 7, Israel’s internal security service, the Shin Bet, dispatched only a small team to the border when dozens, perhaps hundreds, of Israeli SIM cards were suddenly connected to Israeli networks. . At a hastily convened meeting around 3:30 a.m. on October 7, Israeli Defense Forces leaders were unsure whether Hamas’ unusual activity in Gaza was training or preparation for an attack.
Q&A What are the main failures of intelligence on October 7th? Show
“concept”
Many in Israel speak of a “concept,” a collective belief that Hamas has been deterred or pacified through repeated conflicts and economic incentives. The term refers to a similar mass of misjudgments among decision-makers prior to the 1973 war against Egypt and Syria. It suggests complacency and arrogance at the highest levels of the nation, as it did then. It also fit with a broader Israeli policy of refusing to make any political concessions, such as allowing progress toward a Palestinian state, and a strategy of exacerbating divisions in Palestinian politics. Israeli commentators have repeatedly said the initiative contributed to Hamas’ failure to anticipate and prepare for a major attack.
Overreliance on technology
The most obvious technological defense against attack was the multibillion-dollar fence built around Gaza, complete with sniper towers and surveillance systems. This was considered completely impregnable. However, another major problem was the reliance on surveillance and wiretapping to monitor Hamas and its allied organizations within its territory. Without human informants in Gaza, Israel’s intelligence gathering efforts were inadequate. These deployed resources were focused on thwarting Hamas rocket attacks on Israel. The infiltration of the Lebanese-based Islamic extremist group Hezbollah, which was seen as a bigger threat, attracted much attention.
Warnings are missed or ignored
Evidence of attack plans that reached the Israeli military was either misinterpreted or ignored. In 2022, Israel obtained Hamas plans for a large-scale attack through the fence, codenamed “Jericho Walls.” Despite its importance, the plan was hidden because authorities believed the group was incapable of carrying out such an operation.
Last summer, there were warnings that Hamas had completed a series of training exercises simulating attacks on kibbutzim and IDF outposts on the Israeli side of the border. An intelligence report said intensive training was underway among Hamas’s elite Nuqba fighters, including mass attacks on military positions and the taking of prisoners.
On October 6, some observers told senior officers about individual Hamas commanders who appeared to be preparing something. As before, suspicious activity was dismissed as “routine.”
smoke screen
Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar took unusual steps to ensure the security of the October 7 operation, telling almost no one what was planned. But at the same time he set up a smokescreen, deceiving Israel with potentially misleading public statements, sometimes coming close to telling the truth, and luring him into false security.
In 2022, Hamas produced a television series called “Fist of the Free,” depicting a mass attack on Israel by its militants. Shinwar presented prizes to all involved at a public ceremony and in a speech praised the accuracy of the series and said their work was “an integral part of what we are preparing.”
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But while public anger toward the intelligence agencies was great, some of the most scathing criticism was directed at the Israel Defense Forces themselves for failing to mobilize quickly to protect communities. Although some regular army units, police and other forces were called into action in the first hours of the October 7 attack, the fighting was carried out by a small group of reservists who had acquired their uniforms and weapons at home. often played a decisive role.
Nimrod Palmach, a major in the reservists and the chief executive of an Israeli NGO, ignored orders to join special forces in Jerusalem and left the South after hearing that “thousands of terrorists” were on kibbutz Nir Oz. I drove to There were 46 of the approximately 400 residents on the kibbutz. According to the United Nations, 72 people were killed and abducted by extremists visiting people’s homes.
“I just picked up a handgun and went as far as I could. I realized at every moment that people were being killed. “I left a video will on my phone for this purpose,” he said.
Armed with an assault rifle taken from a dead Hamas militant, Palmach fought for hours with other reservists and a small group of regular soldiers around the Behri kibbutz, taking bulletproof vests from dead soldiers. According to a UN report, residents of 105 kibbutzim were killed by military forces of Hamas and its allied group Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as well as armed civilians in Gaza.
“Initially, it was just us and the special forces that came from home, but as the day went on, more and more sporadic (regular Israel Defense Forces) units arrived. By late afternoon, all of the Israel Defense Forces “The squad arrived in a combat battalion in full gear. Many good warriors were waiting for instructions and orders that never came,” Palmach said.
One reason for the slow response was that IDF forces around Gaza were fighting for their lives during the critical first hours of the Hamas offensive, which resulted in most casualties. The garrison was not at full strength because of the Jewish festival Simchat Torah holiday weekend, with only a few hundred soldiers spread out in small detachments around the perimeter fence. Many were killed or kidnapped when their positions were overrun. Some fought desperately for hours to avoid the same fate. A fierce attack on the regional headquarters in Reims, just a kilometer away from the Nova festival, was largely successful, which partly explains the apparent paralysis of the regional commanders and their superiors. The attack destroyed critical surveillance and communications equipment.
A Palestinian overpowers an Israeli tank after crossing the border fence on October 7, 2023. Photo: Said Khatib/AFP/Getty Images
“There was no central command, so we didn’t know what to do, where to go… There was no connection between the units,” said one of the first Special Forces soldiers to arrive in the combat zone. said. “We were too small in number, and when we tried to enter the kibbutz, we were attacked by hundreds of Hamas soldiers. We retreated to wait for a larger force.”
Some of those interviewed by the Guardian recalled that the situation began to stabilize late on October 7, although the fighting continued for more than 48 hours and the remaining militants were discovered and killed. was. Some stayed behind to help, while others drove back to the homes they had left just 10 or 12 hours earlier. As the initial shock wore off, they tried to make sense of the day’s events.
“We have always been trained to be aggressive, to be aggressive…but it was the other way around,” said the special forces soldier. “I still (see)…the dead children, the burnt corpses, the girls who were participating in the festival.”
As for the engineers, they still don’t understand what went wrong on October 7, 2023.
“Actually, I have no idea what happened,” he told the Guardian. “I keep thinking about it. But I don’t know.”
